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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
LEONARD D. WATERS,
Deceased.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

HELENA WATERS, personal
representative of the Estate of
Leonard D. Waters,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 20000017-CA

DARLA JORGENSON, JEANNA SCOTT,
BARBARA D. REYNOLDS, THEORDORA
ANN (TEDDI) BROWN, SHERRIE M.
ALLAN, and FREDERICK L. WATERS,
Respondents/Appellees
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
U.C.A.

Jurisdiction of this appeal is in the Court of Appeals by

Order of the

Supreme Court, dated March 28, 2000.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE
Appellant has previously attached copies of certain sections
of the Uniform Probate Code regarding allowances. Attached hereto
as Addendum JA_ is a copy of §§78-11-6.5 and 7, the wrongful death

statues in Utah.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case
The deceased, Leonard D. Waters, died December 14, 1996.
Petitioner is the personal representative of the Estate, and
the surviving spouse.
Respondents are the adult children of deceased; and they are
not the children of the Petitioner.
The Decedent, Leonard D. Waters, was married to Petitioner
Helena Waters, at the time of his death.

She has the following

children (not minors), Respondents herein: Darla Jorgensen, Jeanna
Scott, Barbara D. Reynolds, Theodora (Teddi) Brown, Sherry Allen,
and Frederick Waters. The Decedent died intestate. At the time of
his death, he held title in joint tenancy to a residence in Tooele,
with his wife. He also had a pension with survivor benefits. Upon
his death, a wrongful death action was filed in which all of the
parties to this action were Plaintiff's.

This Court, Hon. L. A.

Dever, approved a settlement of the wrongful death action in which
the proceeds of that wrongful death action were paid into the
estate.

A copy of that Order Approving Wrongful Death Settlement

is included as Addendum 6 of the brief of Appellant.
consists largely of the proceeds of that action.

The estate

Petitioner has

also asked for a personal property allowance in the amount of
$5,000 and a family allowance.

These items were denied by the

District Court, which also ordered an interpleader action filed to
determine the shares to the various parties in the proceeds of the
2

wrongful death action.
interlocutory

The supreme Court accepted this matter for

appeal, and assigned the case to this court for

further proceedings.
Statement of Facts
Respondents

accept

the

Statement

of

Facts

submitted

by

Petitioner, except where specifically controverted herein.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court was under no obligation to defer to a previous
ruling by a previous Trial Court Judge regarding the distribution
of shares of the proceeds of a wrongful death action brought by the
parties to this action.

The Trial Court was not bound by "law of

the case"; nor did the order of the previous Trial Court judge
prohibit a determination of shares by the later judge, in the
proceeds of the lawsuit.
Petitioner is not entitled to a homestead exemption, as a
homestead

exemption

of Utah

is comprised

of

interest

in real

property which the decedent had at the time of his death.
was no such interest in real property.

There

Neither is the Petitioner

entitled to an exempt property allowance or a family allowance, at
this time.

The exempt property

allowance

is fact

intensive,

relying on what property there was, and what other assets the
estate has.

Those determinations have not been made.

A family

allowance is a short term benefit to tide the spouse and minor
3

children over until proceeds of an estate have been distributed.
This request was made more than three years after the death; and
during a period in which Petitioner was receiving a pension in
behalf of the decedent. The equities of the situation cannot favor
such an award.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO DEFER TO A
INTERLOCUTORY DECISION OF A PREVIOUS TRIAL JUDGE.

PREVIOUS

As stated in paragraph 3 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts,
the parties to this action were co-plaintiffs in a civil action in
Clark County, Nevada for, among other things, wrongful death.

As

stated in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Facts, a settlement was
reached. A substantial portion of the settlement was paid out for
a

medical

lien,

attorney's

fees,

and

other

expenses.

No

differentiation was made in the settlement between the various
causes of action brought by the Plaintiffs therein.

As stated in

paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts, the Nevada attorney for the
various parties, indicated to those parties that he may have a
conflict of interest involving the shares to the various parties.
A stipulation was therefore entered into between the various
plaintiffs to allow the proceeds of the settlement to be paid to
decedent's estate, and for a later determination to be made
regarding the proceeds.

The stipulation was prepared by counsel

for the estate, also counsel for Petitioner herein. No explanation
was made to any of the plaintiffs regarding the legal consequences
4

of paying money into the Estate in Utah, rather than into some
other entity.

Clearly, in the minds of the individual plaintiffs,

the arrangement was done for the simple purpose of getting the
proceeds to Utah for a later determination as to the proper parties
to be awarded those proceeds.
As further stated in Petitioner's Statement of Facts, the
Third District Court signed an order approving the settlement. The
order did not state exactly as Petitioner claims, however.

The

order signed by Judge Dever stated:
(9) The attorney for the Plaintiffs in said wrongful death
action is hereby authorized and ordered to pay the net
proceeds from the aforementioned settlement to the personal
representative of decedent's estate, Helena Waters, or her
attorney, for administration and subsequent distribution to
heirs.
The

wording

of

the

order

reinforces

the

contention

of

Respondents herein that this was a measure of convenience, without
a

determination

distributed.

as to how the property would

eventually be

It was a simple Order to transfer the property to the

jurisdiction of the Utah court. The court referred to the proceeds
as that from "wrongful death" even though there.were other causes
of action in which Petitioner might have had priority over the
proceeds. Certainly this order was not meant to be contrary to law
regarding the distribution of proceeds from a wrongful death
action.
Petitioner

now

wants

this

Court

to

determine

that

the

agreement and order were designed to prioritize who would receive
the benefits of the wrongful death action.
entity for the money to be paid into.
5

There was no other

No hearing was held on the

effects of payment to the estate, rather than another independent
escrow entity.

Petitioner, who is also personal representative of

the Estate, now claims that the money is hers, and that the laws of
intestate succession apply, rather than Utah law regarding the
proceeds of a wrongful death action. Because of the order of Judge
Dever, they claim the matter is closed, and that the trial court
herein (Judge Young) had no authority or jurisdiction, under "law
of the case" to further deal with the money. That is obviously not
correct.

As set forth in AMS Salt Industries v. Magnesium Corp.,

942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997), this doctrine would not apply in the
current situation.

The Utah Supreme Court there set forth a

general rule:
...that "one district court judge cannot* overrule another
District Court judge of equal authority." However, there are
several exceptions to this general rule. One exception is
when "the issues decided by the first judge are presented to
the second judge in a 'different light,7 as where a summary
judgment initially denied is subsequently granted after
additional evidence
is adduced."
(internal citations
omitted)(emphasis in original). 942 P.2d at 319.
The parties had been cooperating in an effort to prosecute the
action

for wrongful

death in Nevada.

Their

joint

attorney

suggested that the money be transferred to the court in Utah for a
further

determination

of

shares.

No

independent

counsel

represented any of the parties in any portion of this proceeding.
Only two weeks thereafter, however, Petitioner filed petitions for
homestead

allowance,

personal

property

allowance

and

family

allowance (Paragraph 8 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts).
6

The

amount paid in to "the personal representative...for administration
and subsequent distribution to heirs" made up the bulk of the
estate property.

When petitioner filed the petitions for the

various allowances, it was clear now that she intended to have it
all. She had sprung her trap. Her unsuspecting step-children, who
might be entitled to a portion of the proceeds of the wrongful
death action, now had to stand behind the "grieving widow" who had
a long list of priorities which she intended to use to take it all.
Obviously, Judge Young saw this situation in a far different light
than did Judge Dever.

As such, he was entitled to review the

situation in terms of the situation as it then existed, not as it
existed at the time of Judge Dever's order.

The law of the case

has no application here whatsoever.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS LEGALLY CORRECT IN ITS DECISION REGARDING
PROCEEDS OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION.
All of the parties to this action were named Plaintiffs in an
action brought in Nevada for wrongful death.

As indicated by

Petitioner, the case was settled for the policy limits of the other
party's insurance policy. The payment by the insurance company of
$100,000.00 went partially to the attorney in Nevada, and for costs
of litigation.

The attorneys fee was one third, $33,333.33. Also

deducted from the settlement was $30,000.00 on a subrogation claim
by the health insurance plan of the decedent.
7

The rest was paid

into the estate for distribution to the heirs.
Petitioner now claims that the wrongful death action was not
really a wrongful death action at all.

Petitioner claims that it

was, in part, an action by the estate for medical bills payable by
the estate.

No claim has been made by the estate for any such

medical bills.

Any such expenses were paid to the insurance

company prior to the distribution to the estate and the heirs.
Petitioner also claims that the causes of action brought in
Nevada

included

loss of marital

consortium.

Utah does not

recognize a cause of action for marital consortium.

See Hackford

v. Utah Power and Light Co. , 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987) . The public
policy of the State of Utah is clear.

The distribution of the

funds received from the wrongful death action are distributable
under Utah law, not that of the State of Nevada. That was the very
purpose for returning the proceeds to Utah for further proceedings.
The decedent was a resident of the State of Utah and certainly did
not have sufficient contacts in Nevada to warrant the use of Nevada
law under accepted principles of conflicts of law.
Obviously, the family talked together and felt it appropriate
to bring the proceeds from the wrongful death action back to Utah
for distribution.

Only after that time, and almost three years

after the date of death, did the Petitioner herein attempt to
obtain the whole of the proceeds by making claims for various
8

allowances which were never made before.

Petitioner, in arguing

that she has been treated unfairly, certainly comes in with
"unclean hands". Petitioner set up a trap for the other heirs, and
sprang it on them as soon as the money was received in Utah.

This

court should not assist her in doing that.
The State of Utah recognizes a wrongful death action as a
statutory claim.

According to Utah law, an estate may bring a

claim of action for the benefit of the heirs. The leading case on
this matter, Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980) states
in relevant part:
Under the wrongful death statute, there is but one cause of
action, viz., it arises from a particular wrongful act for
which there can be but one claim against the tort-feasor for
damages. Whether the action be prosecuted by the personal
representative or on or more of the heirs, it is for the
benefit of the heirs, and all heirs are bound thereby. 606
P.2d at 246.
Under Utah law, the Estate holds the proceeds of a wrongful
death action for the benefit of the heirs. Pursuant to §87-11-6.5
U.C.A. the heirs include both the spouse and the children; and
because the loss each suffered is a question of fact, the parties
are not ranked in order of preference for shares of the recovery.
The Nevada attorney was admittedly in no position to distribute to
the various parties he represented, the shares of the proceeds.
The short and simple agreements that the various parties filed with
this court to pay the money into to the estate, were prepared by
9

the attorney for the petitioner.

The petitioner was, pursuant to

statute, the caretaker of any proceeds from the wrongful death
action.

She was also, of course, a prime claimant, a naturally

conflicting position.

Her attorney certainly had a conflict of

interest as attorney for the Estate, the caretaker, and the
attorney for the claimant, the widow.

There is no claim made by

the widow or her attorney that they made the other Plaintiffs aware
of the conflict between the Estate as caretaker, and the selfserving personal representative.

Counsel may have appeared to be

working for the common good, as had been done by the attorney in
Nevada, when he drafted the agreement to pay the money to the
Estate.

Nevertheless, he was not doing so.

If he did this with a conscious intent to eliminate any claim
the other Plaintiffs may have had to the proceeds of the wrongful
death claim, he certainly violated Rule 1.7 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct by not explaining the conflict; and the
agreement should not be enforced in this manner. The filing, about
two weeks later, of the petitions for homestead, personal property
allowance and family allowance certainly points to a planned
attempt to eliminate any shares of the proceeds of the lawsuit to
anybody outside of the personal representative.

The agreement

should be read as a simple means to bring the money to Utah for
further proceedings -- not to extinguish the shares of the children
10

of the decedent.
This reading of Judge Dever's Order seems to be borne out by
following paragraph:
8. Since the aforementioned settlement did.not differentiate
between the various claims of the estate and those of the
individual Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs stipulated and agreed
that the net proceeds from the settlement of the
aforementioned lawsuit shall be considered an asset of the
decedent's estate and shall be distributed to the heirs of
decedent's estate according to the laws of intestate
succession of the State of Utah. (Emphasis added).
This seems to point to a conclusion that a determination had
not yet been made as to the status of the various claims of the
plaintiffs.

Therefore, the Order says that the proceeds have been

turned over to the estate for distribution to the heirs. While the
order does mention "intestate succession" it certainly would be
fair to read the term "heirs" in the manner set forth in the
statute on wrongful death.

In other words, the shares due to the

heirs is a factual determination to be made on the basis of the
loss.
Petitioner, in her brief, states that her attorney "may have
inadvertently contributed to that misconception by Respondent in
entitling her petition as a "Petition for Approval of Wrongful
Death Settlement". (Aplt. Br. 11). Petitioner's attorney drafted
the agreements, the petition, and the order. The stepchildren, who
had been jointly represented by a single attorney with Petitioner
in Nevada, were certainly unaware that the circumstances had
11

changed.

The attorney drafting the documents at this point was

clearly adverse to them; but they were never directed to obtain
their own counsel.

It is basic to American Jurisprudence that,

where one party drafts a document containing ambiguities, those
ambiguities should be resolved against the party who has drawn the
contract. See Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982).

The

agreements, the petition, and the order are ambiguous as to whether
the proceeds of the Nevada lawsuit were paid into the personal
representative as caretaker, or for her sole benefit.

Those

ambiguities should be resolved against her.
The trial court, in ordering an interpleader in this action,
did the only thing that made sense. An interpleader is defined by
Rule 22 U.R.C.P.

The function of an interpleader is to compel

conflicting complainants to litigate their claims among themselves.
See Maycock v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 179
(1932) . The Court determined that the personal representative held
money as a result of a legal action in which both Petitioner and
Respondents were Plaintiffs. The Court was correct in ruling that
no final determination of the relative shares of the parties had
yet been made, and that the personal representative still held the
proceeds without specific instructions as to how to handle them.
The

Interpleader

action

was

necessary

to

make

that

final

determination. Further, the public policy arguments that she makes
12

for a larger share of the proceeds are within the purview of an
Interpleader action pursuant to Rule 22. The trial court did not
decided that Petitioner will get nothing from the proceeds of the
wrongful death action. The court did not decide she in fact is not
entitled to all of it.

It simply decided that both sides should

have a fair hearing to determine, on the equities of the situation,
who should get what.

The court is entitled to review the entire

situation once an interpleader has been filed, and to determine how
the proceeds should be equitably distributed.
POINT III
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE UNDER UTAH
LAW.
Petitioner has made claims against Estate property sufficient
to make sure that there is no property or proceeds of the wrongful
death action left for any heir, other than herself. The agreement
between the parties that the proceeds would be paid into the estate
was done on the assumption that all of the family members would
take something thereunder.
agreement.

Otherwise, there would have been no

Petitioner argues that the homestead allowance in the

form of real property only is "outmoded".

The law on the matter,

Section 75-2-401 U.C.A., states nothing of the kind.

Respondents

believe that the word "homestead" means exactly what is says. The
only other place that a homestead is mentioned in the Utah Code is
§ 78-23-3, et seq., in which a "homestead exemption" also in the
13

deceased

left

a wife and

offspring of the wife.

six children, none of whom

are the

The residence was in joint tenancy; and the

residence was the main item of value in which the deceased had an
interest.

Petitioner has received that, by action of law.

The law

allows children who are not also the children of the surviving
spouse

to

deductions.
share.

receive

some

part

of

the

estate,

after

certain

Petitioner, as the surviving spouse, gets the lion's

To read the law as suggested by Petitioner is to entirely

disinherit the rest of the family.

This is, as Petitioner admits,

a case of first impression, at least as far as appellate courts in
this state are concerned.

Respondents ask that the plain meaning

of the statute be applied, and that they retain some interest in
the Estate.
Petitioner admits that originally a homestead allowance or
exemption was, in fact, an interest in real property owned by the
decedent at his death.

This Petitioner argues, however, that the

Uniform Probate Code changed that interest to one in money, rather
than specific property.

In support of that proposition, she sites

cases in Montana and Idaho.

The Montana case, Matter of Estate of

Merkel, 618 P. 2d 872 (Mont. 1980) comes to that conclusion after
this interesting observation:
The courts of other states which have enacted the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) have not considered this question, nor do
the Commission's comments, specifically address this issue.
Pre-Code law in Montana indicates that the homestead was a
life estate only.
The purpose of the homestead was to
preserve the fee interest for the heirs of the decedent, while
setting aside a life estate, safe from creditors, for the
14

spouse and family of the decedent.

618 P. 2d 876.

It is only because the new Probate Code eliminated the
reference to life estate, that the Montana Court determined that
the homestead allowance can now be in the form of personal property
or money.

Arizona allows the homestead allowance as money rather

than an interest in specific property, by specific statute, "in
lieu of any homestead".

See A.R.S.§ 021 14-2401.

The Colorado

Court of Appeals, in In re Estate of Robbie J. Dodge, 685 P.2d 260
(Colo. App. 1984) referred to a homestead exemption as outdated.
Nevertheless, they upheld it as an interest in real estate. In the
trial court, Petitioner cited the California case of Estate of
Liccardo, 232 Cal.App.3d 962 (Cal. App. 6 District 1991) for the
proposition that only property within the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court can be selected as a homestead allowance. The Court
also found that only real property qualifies in California for a
homestead exemption or allowance; and no reference is made to that
case in Plaintiff's of Petitioner's brief here.
Petitioner also cites the case of Matter of Estate of Wagley,
760 P.2d 316 (Utah 1988) for the proposition that the right of a
surviving spouse to an exempt personal property allowance is
absolute.

In a footnote, Petitioner states "the Wagley decision

does

discuss

not

homestead

allowances

because

no

homestead

allowance was ever claimed in that case." (Aplt. Br. 20).

No

homestead allowance was requested in that case for the very reason
that no homestead allowance is authorized here. The Supreme Court
15

treated the question in a matter of fact manner:

"In the case

before us, the decedent left no real estate, and no homestead
exemption was therefore claimed." 760 P.2d 318.

The reference to

§ 75-2-402 of the Utah Code was to a statute which remained
unchanged until after the death of decedent herein. Thus, there is
no homestead allowance for Petitioner to claim, as there was no
real estate belonging to decedent.
POINT IV
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPT PROPERTY ALLOWANCE OF A
FAMILY ALLOWANCE.
Petitioner, incredibly, does not directly address the issuance
of the requested Exempt Property Allowance or the Family Allowance
in her brief, though she has included them as issues in her appeal.
Petitioner asks for an exempt property allowance pursuant to
§ 75-2-402 U.C.A.

Leonard Waters died on December 14, 1996. The

Petitioner has been in sole custody and control of all property and
income for three years. No accounting whatsoever has been made of
anything that has been obtained, sold, or used up, during those
three years.

Without a formal accounting, it simply cannot be

determined whether "there is not $5,000 worth of exempt property in
the Estate".

An additional allowance of cash clearly cannot be

made until that determination by the Court is final.
After three years, Petitioner now also asks for a family
allowance pursuant to Section 75-2-403.

Once again, this is

another nail in the coffin, designed to prohibit any other member
16

of the family from obtaining any of the proceeds of the wrongful
death action.

The purpose of the statute

is to obtain "a

reasonable allowance in money out of the estate for the maintenance
during the administration." This allowance is due to the surviving
spouse and the minor children.

There are no minor children.

Petitioner admittedly continues to receive a pension from the
former employment of the deceased.

Petitioner suggests that the

amount of the pension benefits were decreased after Mr. Waters
died.

She now suggests that the estate should make up that

difference in the form of a family allowance.

As the trial court

indicated in oral arguments on the matter, a widow's allowance
under a pension plan is deliberately less than the payments would
be if the Decedent had continued to live. That is because it costs
one person considerably less to live than it costs for two.
is

not

a

reasonable

administration.

allowance

for

maintenance

during

This
the

That should have been applied for and granted

three years ago. Instead, it is one last attempt to make sure that
the rest of the family receives nothing.

That attempt should be

denied.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's rulings regarding the. proceeds of the
wrongful death action, should be affirmed.

The Trial Court simply

required an evidentiary proceeding determine the equities of the
situation; and the law favors such proceedings. Petitioner is not
entitled to additional allowances that she claims, and the Trial
17

required an evidentiary proceeding determine the equities of the
situation; and the law favors such proceedings. Petitioner is not
entitled to additional allowances that she claims, and the Trial
Court should be affirmed in that regard as well.
DATED this

day of September, 2000.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, LLC

M-

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

^s"

[ day of September, 2000,

I did mail two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellees, postage prepaid, to:

Wynn Bartholomew, Esq.
5505 South 900 East
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
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78-11-1
Section
78-11-3.
78-11-4.
78-11-5.
78-11-6.
78-11-6.5.
78-11-7.
78-11-8.
78-11-9.
78-11-10.
78-11-11.
78-11-12.

78-11-12.5.
78-11-13.
78-11-14.
78-11-15.
78-11-16.
78-11-17.
78-11-18.
78-11-19.

78-11-20.
78-11-20.5.
78-11-20.7.
78-11-21.
78-11-22.
78-11-22.1.
78-11-22.2.
78-11-23.
78-11-24.
78-11-25.
78-11-26.
78-11-27.

578

JUDICIAL CODE
78-11-3. Deserted spouse.
Deserted spouse.
Seduction — Unmarried individual under 18
may sue.
Seduction of child — Suit by parent or guardian.
Injury or death of child — Suit by parent or
guardian.
Definition of heir.
Death of adult — Suit by heir or personal
representative.
Successive actions on same contract.
Repealed.
Actions against officers — Costs and attorneys'
fees.
Submitting controversy without action.
Survival of action for injury to person or death
upon death of wrongdoer or injured person
— Exception and restriction to out-of-pocket
expenses.
Repealed.
Construction of statute.
Shoplifting — Definitions.
Civil liability of adult for shoplifting — Damages.
Joint liability of minor and parent or guardian
for minor's shoplifting — Exception.
Merchant's right to request customer to hold
merchandise in full view.
Merchant's authority to detain.
Criminal conviction for shoplifting not a prerequisite for civil action under chapter —
Written notice required — Award of penalty
not subject to requirement of compensatory
or general damages.
Property damage caused by a minor — Liability of parent or legal guardian.
Criminal conviction for criminal mischief or
criminal trespass not a prerequisite for civil
action under chapter.
Compensatory service — Graffiti penalties.
Property damage caused by minor — When
parent or guardian not liable.
Good Samaritan Act.
Donation of food — Liability limits.
Donation of nonschedule drugs or devices —
Liability limitation.
Right to life — State policy.
Act or omission preventing abortion not actionable.
Failure or refusal to prevent birth not a defense.
Employer not to discharge or threaten employee for responding to subpoena — Criminal penalty — Civil action by employee.
Defense to civil action for damages resulting
from commission of crime.

78-11-1. Married w o m a n .
A married woman may sue and be sued in the same m a n n e r
as if she were unmarried.
1953

78-11-2. Husband and wife sued together — Either
may defend.
If husband and wife are sued together, the wife may defend
for her own right, and if either neglects to defend, the other
may defend for both.
1953

When a h u s b a n d has deserted his family, the wife may
prosecute or defend in his n a m e any action which he might
have prosecuted or defended, a n d shall have t h e same powers
and rights therein as he might have, and, under like circumstances, the husband shall have t h e same
right.
1953

78-11-4. Seduction — Unmarried individual under 18
may sue.
An u n m a r r i e d individual, under 18 years of age at the time
of seduction, may prosecute as plaintiff an action therefor, and
may recover therein such damages, actual or exemplary as are
assessed in favor of such individual.
1977

78-11-5. Seduction of child — Suit by parent or guardian.
A parent or guardian may prosecute as plaintiff an action for
the seduction of a child who, at the time of seduction, is under
the age of majority, though the child or the ward is not living
with or in the service of the plaintiff at the time of the
seduction or afterwards and there is no loss of service.
1977
78-11-6. Injury or death of child — Suit by parent or
guardian.
Except as provided in Title 35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Compensation Act, a parent or guardian may maintain an action
for t h e d e a t h or injury of a minor child when the injury or
death is caused by t h e wrongful act or neglect of another. Any
civil action may be maintained against the person causing t h e
injury or death or, if t h e person is employed by another person
who is responsible for t h a t person's conduct, also against t h e
employer. If a parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or legal
guardian is t h e alleged defendant in an action for the death or
injury of a child, a guardian ad litem may be appointed for t h e
injured child or a child other t h a n the deceased child according
to t h e procedures outlined in Section 78-7-9.
1996
78-11-6.5.

Definition of heir.

As used in Sections 78-11-7, 78-11-8, and 78-11-12, "heirs"
means:
(1) the following surviving persons:
(a) the decedent's spouse;
(b) the decedent's children as provided in Section
75-2-114;
(c) the decedent's natural parents, or if the decedent was adopted, then his adoptive parents;
(d) the decedent's stepchildren who:
(i) are in their minority at the time of decedent's death; and
(ii) are primarily financially dependent on the
decedent.
(2) "Heirs" means any blood relative as provided by the
law of intestate succession if the decedent is not survived
by a person under Subsections (l)(a), (b), or (c).
1998
78-11-7. Death of adult •— Suit by heir or personal
representative.
Except as provided in Title 35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Compensation Act, when the death of a person not a minor is
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or
his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may
maintain an action for damages against the person causing
the death, or, if such person is employed by another person
who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such
other person. If such adult person has a guardian at the time
of his death, only one action can be maintained for the injury
to or death of such person, and such action may be brought by
either the personal representatives of such adult deceased
person, for the benefit of his heirs, or by such guardian for the
benefit of the heirs as provided in Section 78-11-6. In every
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action under this and Section 78-11-6 such damages may be
given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just.
1996

78-11-8. Successive actions on same contract.
Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract or transaction whenever, after a former action, a new
cause of action arises therefrom.
1953
78-11-9.

Repealed.

1971

78-11-10. Actions a g a i n s t officers — C o s t s a n d attorneys' fees.
Before any action may be filed against any sheriff, constable, peace officer, state road officer, or any other person
charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal laws of
this state, or service of civil process, when such action arises
out of, or in the course of the performance of his duty, or in any
action upon the bond of any such officer, the proposed plaintiff,
as a condition precedent thereto, shall prepare and file with,
and at the time of filing the complaint in any such action, a
written undertaking with at least two sufficient sureties in an
amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned upon the diligent
prosecution of such action, and, in the event judgment in the
said cause shall be against the plaintiff, for t h e payment to t h e
defendant of all costs and expenses that may be awarded
against such plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's fee to
be fixed by the court. In any such action, the prevailing party
therein shall, in addition to an award of costs as otherwise
provided, recover from the losing party therein such s u m as
counsel fees as shall be allowed by the court. The official bond
of any such officer shall be liable for any such costs and
attorney fees.
i953

78-11-11. Submitting controversy without action.
Parties to a question in difference, which might be the
subject of a civil action, may without action agree upon a case
containing the facts upon which the controversy depends, and
present a submission of the same to any court which would
have jurisdiction if an action had been brought. But it must
appear by affidavit that the controversy is real, and that the
proceeding is in good faith, to determine the rights of the
parties. The court must thereupon hear and determine the
case and render judgment thereon as if an action were
pending.
1953
78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or
death upon death of wrongdoer or injured
person — Exception and restriction to out-ofpocket expenses.
(1) (a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the
person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence
of another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer
or the injured person. The injured person or the personal
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a
cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general
damages, subject to Subsection (l)(b).
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a result of a cause other than the injury
received as a result of the wrongful act or negligence of
the wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of
that person are entitled to receive no more than the
out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of that
injured person as the result of his injury.
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor t h e
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died may
recover judgment except upon competent satisfactory evidence
other t h a n the testimony of that injured person.
1991
78-11-12.5.

Repealed.

i996

78-11-13. C o n s t r u c t i o n of s t a t u t e .
This act shall not be construed to be retroactive.

78-11-18
1953

78-11-14. Shoplifting — Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Minor" means any unmarried person under 18
years of age.
(2) "Merchandise" means any personal property displayed, held or offered for sale by a merchant.
(3) "Merchant" means an owner or operator of premises
in which merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale
and includes his employees, servants and agents.
(4) "Premises" means a store or establishment wherein
merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale.
(5) "Wrongful taking of merchandise" means the taking
of merchandise that has not been purchased from a
merchant's premises without the permission of the merchant or one of his employees, servants or agents.
1981
78-11-15. Civil liability of adult for shoplifting — Damages.
An adult who wrongfully takes merchandise by any means,
including but not limited to, concealment or attempted concealment in any manner, either on or off the premises of t h e
merchant, with a purpose to deprive a merchant of merchandise or to avoid payment for merchandise, or both, is liable in
a civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to
t h e merchant in the amount of t h e retail price of the merchandise not to exceed $1,000, plus an additional penalty as
determined by t h e court of not less t h a n $100 nor more t h a n
$500, plus court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
1992

78-11-16. Joint liability of minor and parent or guardian for minor's shoplifting — Exception.
A minor and the parents or legal guardian having legal
custody of such minor, as the case may be, who wrongfully
takes merchandise by any means, including but not limited to,
concealment or attempted concealment in any manner, either
on or off the premises of the merchant, with a purpose to
deprive a merchant of merchandise or to avoid payment for
t h e merchandise, or both, are jointly and severally liable in a
civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to the
merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchandise
not to exceed $500 plus an additional penalty as determined
by the court of not less t h a n $50 nor more t h a n $500, plus
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. No parent or
guardian is liable for damages under this section if he or she
made a reasonable effort to restrain the wrongful taking and
did not fail to report it to the merchant involved or to t h e law
enforcement agency having primary jurisdiction after he or
she knew of t h e minor's unlawful act. No report is required
u n d e r this section from a parent or guardian if the minor was
arrested or apprehended by a peace officer or by anyone acting
on behalf of the merchant involved.
1991

78-11-17. Merchant's right to request customer to hold
merchandise in full view.
Any merchant may request any individual on his premises
to place or keep in full view any merchandise such individual
may have removed, or which the merchant has reason to
believe he may have removed, from its place of display or
elsewhere, whether for examination, purchase or for any other
reasonable purpose. No merchant shall be criminally or civilly
liable on account of having made such a request.
1975

78-11-18. Merchant's authority to detain.
Any merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise
has been wrongfully taken by an individual contrary to
Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 and that he can recover such
merchandise by taking such individual into custody and
detaining him may, for the purpose of attempting to effect such

